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ABSTRACT 
 
Sara Copic: The Aretaic Significance of Moral Beliefs 
(Under the direction of Susan Wolf) 
 
 I argue that a person’s moral beliefs can contribute to or detract from the quality of that 
person’s moral character. I argue that this happens when one’s moral beliefs result from cognitive 
(as opposed to conative) features that contribute to or detract from the quality of one’s moral 
character, and I argue that some cognitive features can do that. I also argue that moral beliefs 
contribute to a person’s moral character when she self-consciously acts in accordance with those 
beliefs. Likewise, self-consciously flouting one’s moral views detracts from a person’s moral 
goodness. Since I maintain that conative states also play a part in constituting quality of moral 
character, my view is a hybrid view. This approach contrasts with the fully desire-based account of 
moral goodness that Arpaly and Schroeder present in In Praise of Desire. I present the desire-based 
account and show that a hybrid view has some explanatory advantages.  
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Introduction 
 
 I will argue that moral beliefs play an important role in contributing to and reflecting the 
quality of  a person's moral character. While desires can and do contribute to and detract from the 
quality of  a person's moral character, desires do not by themselves constitute the quality of  a 
person's moral character or, in other words, a person's degree of  moral goodness. This makes room 
for the view that beliefs can contribute to or detract from the quality of  a person's moral character 
without deriving from desires. I will show that beliefs can do this in two ways. 
 A person's moral character is the set of  features a person has that ground appropriate moral 
appraisal of  that person, either considered as a diachronic unity or considered at a particular 
moment in time. For example, a person's moral character may contain a proper subset of  the agent's 
desires, beliefs, and dispositions. Here, I will argue that beliefs deserve their place in this set in such a 
way that they don't have to derive from desires. I will not provide a strategy for comparing the 
extent to which beliefs and desires (either taken together or independently) contribute to the quality 
of  a person's moral character in particular circumstances, nor will I present a way to calculate (so to 
speak) the extent to which a person has a good moral character, either over a fixed period of  time or 
at a particular moment. I simply aim to show that a person's beliefs can, without deriving from that 
person's desires, contribute to the quality of  the person's moral character. 
 Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder (2014) argue that good and ill will, praise- and 
blameworthiness, and moral virtue and vice are all ultimately explained by what desires we have and 
how we conceptualize those desires. In short, on their view, the quality of  a person's moral character 
is ultimately constituted by our desires (that is, by a person's will) as long as they are conceptualized 
in the right way and beliefs are not part of  this ultimate explanation. Belief  only plays a derivative 
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role in reflecting the quality of  person's moral character—a belief  reflects the quality of  a person's 
moral character only insofar as the person has that belief  because of  her intrinsic desires.1 
Moreover, while beliefs can reflect the moral quality of  a person's will, they can never contribute to or 
(even partially) constitute the quality of  a person's moral character. Actions partly based on moral 
beliefs reflect a person's moral character only insofar as those beliefs appropriately derive from the 
desires that constitute the character of  a person's will. On their view, the quality of  a person's desire 
set (that is, her will) fully grounds the quality of  a person's moral character. 
 In what follows, I will present Arpaly and Schroeder's desire-based account of  what it takes 
to have a good moral character. I will then argue for a hybrid account according to which both 
desires and beliefs can contribute to or detract from the quality of  a person's moral character. 
 
Spare Conativism 
 It is commonly thought that to have a good moral character is to have certain psychological 
features. Arpaly and Schroeder's view, which they call Spare Conativism (SC), is a view about which 
psychological features constitute what it is to be a good person or, in other words, what it is to have 
a good moral character and what kind of  content and character these psychological features have. 
SC tells us that the only psychological features constitutive of  a good moral character are certain 
kinds of  desires. In fact, according to Arpaly and Schroeder, having a good moral character is fully 
constituted by having these kinds of  desires; they form a complete explanatory base that grounds all 
of  the notions connected with the moral appraisal of  persons and they therefore specify the truth-
conditions for judgments about the moral quality of  a person's character. Since the basic units that 
constitute the quality of  a person's moral character are desires (albeit with a particular content and 
                                                          
1Instrumental and realizer desires do not contribute to goodness of  will, and beliefs that reflect these desires therefore 
do not reflect goodness of  will. See Arpaly and Schroeder (6-10, 87-88). 
3 
 
conceptualization), SC implies that the quality of  a person's moral character just is the quality of  the 
person's will or the person's desire set; the will is all there is to moral character. 
 According to SC, having good will consists in having the right intrinsic desires, correctly 
conceived, and having ill will consists in having the wrong intrinsic desires, correctly conceived.2 The 
right intrinsic desires are desires for the right or the good, which is specified by the correct moral 
theory. Likewise, the wrong intrinsic desires are desires for the wrong or the bad, which is also 
specified by the correct moral theory. Interestingly, the way the person of  good will must conceive 
of  her desires in order to count as having good will is also specified by the correct moral theory, and 
likewise for the person of  ill will. The person of  good will must not only desire whatever is good or 
right, but must also conceive of  her desires in a particular way in order to count as having good will. 
 One important clarification to note is that Arpaly and Schroeder's definitions of  good and ill 
will do not trade merely on the distinction between desires for the good de dicto and desires de re. 
Arpaly and Schroeder are careful to emphasize this point with the help of  an example (in their 
example, a phrase in all capital letters represents the conceptualization or mode of  presentation of  
the desire): 
If  Lillian’s intrinsic desire is for THE RIGHT while Shamissa’s is to RESPECT PERSONS, 
and if  Kantian normative theory is correct, then on our account the following things appear 
to be true: Lillian intrinsically desires the right or good de dicto, Shamissa intrinsically desires 
the right or good de re, and only Shamissa has so far been shown to have good will. 
However, both Lillian and Shamissa intrinsically desire the good de re. They both have the 
right itself, that very thing, as the object of  their desires, as the referent of  their respective 
concepts (165). 
 
Why is it that Shamissa is the only one who has been shown to have good will, according to SC? 
Both Lillian and Shamissa intrinsically desire the good de re, and hence both of  them meet one 
necessary condition for having good will. But Shamissa has good will in virtue of  conceptualizing 
                                                          
2This definition of  good will is intended to be neutral between various first-order moral theories (Arpaly and Schroeder, 
1). 
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this desire in the right way, namely, in the terms specified by the correct moral theory, which is 
supposed to be Kantian normative theory. To have good will, one must not only desire the good de 
re, but one's desire must be presented in terms of  the concepts of  the correct ethical theory. 
Therefore Lillian, who desires the good de re and de dicto but does not conceptualize this desire in 
terms of  respecting persons, does not have good will. While I do not find it plausible to say that 
Lillian does not have good will, I am going to set this aside. However, the distinction between de re 
and de dicto beliefs about the right will become important for my positive arguments for the moral 
significance of  beliefs. We will get to the examples that are meant to motivate this view below. 
 It will be useful to list Arpaly and Schroeder's definitions in order to refer back to them later 
(162-163): 
Complete good will is an intrinsic desire for [the whole of] the right or good, correctly 
conceptualized (i.e., presented via the correct sense, mode of  presentation, narrow content, 
primary intension […]). 
 
Partial good will is an intrinsic desire for some part of  the right or good, correctly 
conceptualized. 
 
Complete ill will is an intrinsic desire for [the whole of] the wrong or bad, correctly 
conceptualized. 
 
Partial ill will is an intrinsic desire for some part of  the wrong or bad, correctly 
conceptualized. 
 
Notice that, in the example above, and on the assumption of  the truth of  Kantian normative theory, 
Shamissa correctly conceptualizes her desire for the right and Lillian does not. This is because Lillian 
does not conceive of  her desire as a desire to respect persons. Consider: a utilitarian might also 
desire THE RIGHT, de dicto and de re, without any further detail in his conceptualization of  the 
desire. He desires the right, whatever it is, in those terms. But since the utilitarian doesn't conceive of  
her desire in terms of  respect for persons, he does not count as having good will on this view. 
Likewise, Lillian only desires THE RIGHT, whatever it is. But this does not, according to Arpaly and 
Schroeder, suffice for good will. 
5 
 
 Now, Arpaly and Schroeder also note that a person can lack good will without thereby 
having ill will, and that one can lack ill will without thereby having good will. So, we are also given 
the following definitions (163): 
Moral indifference is a lack of  good will. A person is more morally indifferent the less 
good will she has. 
 
Reverse moral indifference is a lack of  ill will. A person is more reverse morally indifferent 
the less ill will she has. 
 
Lillian does not have ill will. This is because she fails to conceptualize her desire for the right 
correctly, namely, in Kantian terms. Rather, Lillian is merely morally indifferent since she fails to 
have good will. She does not have ill will because she does not desire the bad or the wrong. 
 One of  SC's greatest achievements, according to Arpaly and Schroeder, is its explanatory 
power as compared to its parsimonious explanatory base. Good and ill will are defined in terms of  
intrinsic desires, correctly conceived, and all other morally significant features of  moral character are 
defined in terms of  good and ill will. First, acting for moral reasons is understood in terms of  acting 
out of  good will3. Second, Arpaly and Schroeder define virtue and vice in terms of  good and ill will. 
To be virtuous is just to have significant good will and lack ill will; to be vicious is just to have 
significant ill will or significant moral indifference (202). Third, praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness are also defined in terms of  good and ill will. A person is praiseworthy for a right 
action just in case the action was rationalized by her good will or reverse moral indifference4, and a 
person is blameworthy for a wrong action just in case it was rationalized by her ill will or moral 
                                                          
3Generally, to think or act for a reason is for the event of  one's thinking or acting to be caused by one's other attitudes in 
virtue of  the fact that these attitudes rationalize the thought or action. To think or act for a moral reason is just a subset 
of  thinking or acting for reasons. To think or act for a moral reason is just for one's thinking or acting to be caused by 
one's correctly conceptualized desires for the good or the right, that is, by one's good will. See Arpaly and Schroeder 
(62, 87-88).  
 
4Lack of  ill will, or reverse moral indifference, is an aversion to the wrong or the bad, correctly conceived. A person can 
be praiseworthy for doing something as a result of  feeling an aversion towards doing harm, for example (163). 
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indifference.5 Indeed, it seems that all or most of  the central notions connected to moral appraisal—
acting for moral reasons, good and ill will, virtue and vice, praise- and blameworthiness—are defined 
in terms of  correctly conceptualized intrinsic desires. 
 Moreover, the moral significance of  beliefs is also explained in terms of  intrinsic desires, 
correctly conceptualized.6 On SC, moral beliefs reflect the quality of  a person's will just in case those 
beliefs manifest the person's intrinsic desires that constitute her good will, reverse moral 
indifference, ill will, or moral indifference. Insofar as her moral beliefs don't manifest the relevant 
intrinsic desires, correctly conceptualized, they do not reflect her moral character. This is because the 
quality of  one's moral character is fully explained by reference to the referents and conceptualization 
of  one's intrinsic desires. 
 The same explanation holds for other cognitive features besides beliefs. Arpaly and 
Schroeder admit that there is a cognitive side to virtue. For example, the virtuous person tends to 
notice morally significant details that others just don't see and she tends to be open-minded rather 
than prejudiced.7 Crucially, however, these cognitive features reveal the quality of  a person's moral 
character only if they are manifestations of  her good will or reverse moral indifference, that is, only 
if  they are manifestations of  good intrinsic desires (including aversions to the bad), correctly 
                                                          
5“Praiseworthiness: a person is praiseworthy for a right action A to the extent that A manifests an intrinsic desire (or 
desires) for the complete or partial right or good (correctly conceptualized) or an absence of  intrinsic desires for the 
complete or partial wrong or bad (correctly conceptualized) through being rationalized by it (or them),” (170). Notice 
that this definition of  praiseworthiness contains the definition of  good will and the definition of  reverse moral 
indifference, such that we can state it in this way: a person is praiseworthy for a right action A to the extent that A 
manifests complete or partial good will or reverse moral indifference through being rationalized by  the relevant desire 
(or desires). For Arpaly and Schroeder, “a person is blameworthy for a wrong action A to the extent that A manifests 
an intrinsic desire (or desires) for the complete or partial wrong or bad (correctly conceptualized) or an absence of  
intrinsic desires for the complete or partial right or good (correctly conceptualized) through being rationalized by it (or 
them),” (170). Again, notice that the definition of  blameworthiness contains the definitions of  ill will and moral 
indifference in it. 
 
6See Arpaly and Schroeder (163-166). 
 
7See Arpaly and Schroeder (233-239, 241-245). 
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conceived. By the same token, a vicious person's cognitive features are vicious insofar as they 
manifest ill will or moral indifference.8 Arpaly and Schroeder see the cognitive side of  virtue “as a 
content-efficacious but not rationalized manifestation of  the good will that constitutes virtue” (226). 
This means that the moral goodness of  the virtuous person's cognitive features is also ultimately 
explained by her desires, and likewise for the moral badness of  the vicious person's cognitive 
features. I will return to this topic in detail in the next section. 
 Let us turn to some specific examples that will further explicate SC. I will return to these 
examples throughout the paper in order to show how my proposed account gives, as I'll argue, a 
better and more subtle treatment of  them than the one offered by Arpaly and Schroeder. They use 
the following examples to support SC: 
Brandon1: Brandon is an undergraduate whose moral views have been shaped by the 
writings of  Ayn Rand. He believes that one's only moral duty is to act selfishly, and that 
actions taken for the sake of  helping others are wrong and “pathetic”. Nevertheless, 
Brandon often acts selflessly. Brandon's selfless acts are in fact caused by the right intrinsic 
desires, correctly conceived. He simply doesn't notice how often he fails to act in accordance 
with the moral views he holds because helping others when they are in need just comes 
naturally to him. When his friend asks Brandon to help her move at the last minute, he heads 
over to help without giving it any thought. Suppose his only motivation for helping his 
friend is an intrinsic desire for whatever constitutes the right or the good correctly 
conceived. Brandon has no ulterior motives in helping his friend. Only later does he “realize 
he did the wrong thing” and berate himself  for being “soft”.9 
 
According to SC, Brandon1 does the right thing for the right reasons which, according to Arpaly 
and Schroeder, just amounts to being motivated by the right intrinsic desires, correctly conceived. 
The intuition we are supposed to get from this example is that Brandon1 is praiseworthy for his 
action and that he is “basically a good guy” who is unfortunately just bad at moral theorizing.  Since 
being bad at theorizing—even moral theorizing—does not count against the quality of  a person's 
                                                          
8“So the possessor of  bad beliefs is vicious (and his actions based on the belief  blameworthy), insofar as he is, either 
because his beliefs are manifestations of  ill will or because they are manifestations of  his deficiency of  good will,” 
(236). 
 
9I've altered the details of  example slightly (see Arpaly and Schroeder, 177). 
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good will, Arpaly and Schroeder conclude that Brandon does not lack good will in virtue of  his 
failure of  moral reasoning (177). 
 Notice some elements that, according to Arpaly and Schroeder, do not or should not matter 
for our moral appraisal of  Brandon1. First, the theory of  which Brandon1 is convinced and the 
circumstances that led to his being convinced of  it play no part in grounding the correct appraisal of  
his moral character. The quality of  Brandon1's moral character is not impacted by how 
unreasonable, poorly supported, and out of  sync objectivism is with the moral evidence we can 
expect Brandon to be exposed to and sensitive to—after all, Brandon1 is probably a college-
educated young person living in the 1950s or later in the U.S. Of  course, this is irrelevant if  the 
quality of  one's moral character is fully constituted by the quality of  one's will. Second, failing to act 
in accordance with his moral theory does not detract from (or enhance) the quality of  Brandon1's 
moral character, either; since his action is caused by a morally good desire, correctly conceived, 
flouting his own moral views does not detract from his moral character. 
Brandon2: Brandon is an undergraduate whose moral views have been shaped by the 
writings of  Ayn Rand. He believes that one's only moral duty is to act selfishly, and that 
actions taken for the sake of  helping others are wrong and “pathetic”. When his friend asks 
Brandon to help her move at the last minute, Brandon consciously takes time to consider 
what's in it for him. He decides that helping his friend will benefit him more than if  he 
refuses (free pizza and beer are almost certainly in his future if  he helps, but he runs the risk 
of  weakening a relationship that benefits him if  he doesn't). Brandon judges that it is right 
to help his friend and does so (179). 
 
In the case of  Brandon2, Arpaly and Schroeder conclude that the agent does the right thing for the 
wrong reason, since he acts out of  pure self-interest.10 Brandon2, they claim, does the right thing but 
he does it out of  either partial ill will or partial moral indifference (more likely the latter). Therefore, 
insofar as we can extrapolate from this single action, Brandon2 is not “basically a good guy”. 
 Again, it's worth pointing out some features that are irrelevant according to SC, but that one 
                                                          
10For Arpaly and Schroeder, acting for reasons is understood in terms of  acting on intrinsic desires (63-65). Very 
roughly, the idea seems to be that one acts for the right reasons just in case one's motives mirror the normative reasons 
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might reasonably think are relevant for the correct moral appraisal of  Brandon2. First, the theory of  
which Brandon1 is convinced and the circumstances that led to his being convinced of  it play no 
part in grounding the correct appraisal of  his moral character. Second, Brandon2 believes that he is 
acting rightly and he self-consciously acts in accordance with his moral views. That is, he has a moral 
conscience and self-consciously acts in accordance with it. Pre-theoretically, we judge it to be a good 
thing when a person's conscience constrains and even shapes a person's actions.11 Therefore, it's 
worth noting that acting in accordance with his conscience (albeit a morally misguided conscience) 
does not, for Arpaly and Schroeder, enter into the explanatory base of  the quality of  a person's 
moral character (unless Brandon 2 acts out the desire to act in accordance with conscience and this is 
a desire for the right or the good, correctly conceived). Finally, one way to understand what 
Brandon2 is up to is not merely as acting on purely selfish desires, but also acting out of  a desire to 
do what he believes is right. But according to Arpaly and Schroeder, it's doing the right things as a 
result of  having the right intrinsic desires (correctly conceived) that counts, not doing the right thing 
because one believes it to be right and therefore worth doing. 
 A final example that Arpaly and Schroeder take to support SC: 
Huckleberry Finn (Arpaly and Schroeder's interpretation): Huckleberry Finn befriends a 
runaway slave, Jim, and helps him escape to freedom. Huck judges it is wrong to do so and 
judges that it would be right to turn Jim in. But he simply cannot bring himself  to turn in his 
friend. He desires to do the right thing, correctly conceived—we can suppose that he desires 
to promote his friend's well-being, under that description, and that promoting a person's 
well-being is part of  the right or the good. Huck feels very guilty for knowingly doing “the 
wrong thing” though he in fact acts rightly (178). 
 
Huckleberry Finn's case is purportedly like Brandon1 in that Huck holds the wrong moral views but 
does the right thing for the right reasons, since he is motivated by the morally correct desire, 
                                                          
11Though this is consistent with thinking that flouting one's conscience is better, all things considered, if  a person has 
evil intentions. 
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correctly conceived.12 Like Brandon1, Huck is also bad at moral theorizing and, according to Arpaly 
and Schroeder, our moral appraisal of  Huck should not be affected by this fact. Notice that Huck 
self-consciously acts against his moral conscience. Yet on SC, this does not detract from the quality 
of  his moral character, just as acting in accordance with his conscience does not contribute to the 
quality of  Brandon2's moral character. 
 I agree with Arpaly and Schroeder on several points. First, I agree with the claim that 
Brandon1 is “basically a good guy”, but with a heavy emphasis on the “basically”. What I mean is 
that Brandon1 meets at least one of  the intuitive conditions of  having a partially good moral 
character: he has the right motives. This holds true for Huck Finn as well (though, as we will see, I 
will argue that there is a morally significant difference between Brandon1 and Huck). I also agree 
that Brandon2 has a morally worse character than Brandon1 and Huck; he doesn't even have the 
right motives, after all. 
 But I do not share all of  their intuitions. I believe that Brandon1 and Brandon2 have 
partially bad moral characters in virtue of  holding unreasonable moral theories. I deny the claim that 
one's moral views and moral belief-forming mechanisms reflect one's moral character just in case 
those beliefs and belief-forming processes causally derive from the right (or wrong) intrinsic desires, 
correctly conceived. Supposing that their moral views are not manifestations of  morally bad desires, 
I will argue that Brandon1 and Brandon 2, though not Huck Finn, have a partly bad moral character 
in virtue of  having the moral beliefs that they do. 
 I disagree with Arpaly and Schroeder on a second point. I believe that Brandon2 has a partly 
good moral character in virtue of  self-consciously acting on the basis of  the moral views he 
sincerely believes. Moreover, if  Brandon1 had self-consciously flouted his moral views (he didn't, 
                                                          
12For another treatment of  Huckleberry Finn's case, as well as the variety of  conflicts between conscience and motives, 
see Bennett (1974). 
11 
 
since he only realized that he acted inconsistently with them after the fact), then he would—in virtue 
of  having acted against his conscience—have a partly bad moral character. Huck Finn, because he 
acts against his conscience, also has a bad moral character in virtue of  this fact but, as we will see, 
gets excused to some extent. All three of  these characters may nevertheless be good people for the 
most part. My point is not that acting in accordance with one's moral views is necessary for being a 
good person at all, but that it is one of  the features that contributes to being good or virtuous and 
its lack is a feature that can take away from a person's moral goodness. 
 In the next two sections, I will give positive arguments for these claims. I will challenge 
Arpaly and Schroeder's claim to have correctly characterized that in which good and ill will consists. 
I will argue that beliefs also play a role in reflecting in a non-derivative way the degree of  a person's 
good will. It may sound odd to say that beliefs can, without deriving from desires, contribute to and 
reflect the moral quality of  a person's will. One way to understand the will is as a set of  desires or, 
more strongly, as the set of  an agent's effective desires.13 I agree that we may use the term 'will' in 
this way, but this does not detract from my claim. My substantive claim is that the basic units in 
terms of  which we should assess a person's moral character include not just desires, but also beliefs, 
in a non-derivative way.14 Thus, we should not think of  a person's moral character as consisting of  
good and ill “will”. Rather, it would be better (and more revealing) to speak of  a person's moral 
character, nature, or moral worth instead, and to say that a person's good and ill will are proper parts 
of  her moral character or moral nature. This is opposed to Arpaly and Schroeder's suggestion that 
the quality of  a person's will fully constitutes a person's moral character. Ultimately, I will argue that 
the notions of  good and ill will, where 'will' is understood as a set of  desires (intrinsic or not, 
                                                          
13See Frankfurt (1971). 
 
14On my view, a person's moral commitments and judgments may derive from a person's desires, but the point is that 
they need not. 
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effective or not), provides too thin a basis for moral appraisal of  persons. 
 Another way to put the point is this: Arpaly and Schroeder seem to claim that the quality of  
a person's moral character is ultimately a function of  the quality of  the person's will, understood as 
the set of  a person's intrinsic desires, correctly conceived. By contrast, I claim that the quality of  the 
will only partly contributes to the quality of  a person's moral character. Being a good person also 
depends on the reasons a person ends up with her moral beliefs and on a disposition to act in 
accordance with one's moral commitments, views, or beliefs. 
 
The Cognitive Side of  Moral Character 
 According to Arpaly and Schroeder, virtue has a cognitive side (225). Virtuous people and 
vicious people not only differ with respect to their desires, but they also think in different ways. 
Arpaly and Schroeder write: 
Consider the kind person. She is more inclined to prevent suffering than most of  us, and 
that is an obvious manifestation of  her desire that people not suffer. She is also more 
inclined to feel bad about the suffering of  others, and that too is an obvious manifestation 
of  her good will. But the kind person is also going to have thoughts that are different from 
others' thoughts. The kind person will be more likely to notice suffering: it captures her 
attention. The kind person will be more likely to remember that the person she met three 
months ago was struggling to come to terms with her brother's death: it sticks in her memory. 
The kind person is more likely than others to see an angry man's outburst as a product of  
his feeling threatened and humiliated: it seems plausible to her. And in many other ways, the kind 
person's cognitive life will be different from the cognitive life of  the less-kind person. 
 Consider also the open-minded person. She might have been raised with the idea 
that homosexuals are degenerates, but even so she is able to see that there is nothing 
degenerate about her homosexual labmate. She might dislike the fashion for wearing baseball 
caps backwards, but she is nonetheless able to see that several such backward-capped 
students in her class are very talented. The open-minded person is the opposite of  the 
prejudiced person, in other words, in her cognitive life (225, my emphasis).   
  
 Recall that, on SC, being virtuous just is having significant good will and lack of  ill will (i.e. 
reverse moral indifference).15 Arpaly and Schroeder explain why the virtuous person's cognitive life 
                                                          
15Here, as above, I understand the will to be the set of  the agent's desires and I understand good will and moral 
indifference in the way defined above. 
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tends to be so different from the non-virtuous person's cognitive life as follows: the cognitive 
features typical of  the virtuous person qua virtuous person are manifestations of  her significant 
good will or reverse moral indifference in the sense that her good will or reverse moral indifference 
causes her to have the cognitive features she does.16 In short, the virtuous person has the cognitive 
features she does because of  her good will or reverse moral indifference. Moreover, these cognitive 
features reflect the quality of  the virtuous person's moral character only insofar as they causally 
derive from her good will. Therefore, having the set of  cognitive features typical of  a virtuous 
person cannot contribute to virtue or constitute what it is to be virtuous, even in part, since one's 
having this set of  cognitive features is explained by one's already being virtuous, which just is having 
a significant degree of  good will. If  someone were to have the cognitive traits typical of  the virtuous 
person but lack good will or if  her significant degree of  good will did not cause her to have these 
cognitive features, then they would not reflect the quality her moral character. (This kind of  person 
is possible, on SC, though probably not likely to exist.) 
 I agree with Arpaly and Schroeder that the virtuous person has a cognitive life that reflects 
her virtuous character. Likewise, the vicious person has a cognitive life that reflects his vicious 
character. I disagree, however, that the explanation for the connection between being virtuous and 
having a particular set of  cognitive traits is fully explained by the quality of  the virtuous person's 
will. On my view, having a good moral character is partly constituted by having certain cognitive 
features that are not caused by a person's desires. 
 The virtuous person's cognitive features differ from the vicious person's cognitive features 
with respect to at least the following things: what captures her attention, what she tends to 
remember, what strikes her as plausible, which options seem open to her and which options seem 
                                                          
16“The strategy of  this chapter is to explain the cognitive side of  virtue as a content-efficacious but not rationalized 
manifestation of  the good will that constitutes virtue,” (226). 
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closed, open-mindedness, epistemic humility as opposed to arrogance, what inferences she draws, 
which similarities she notices in morally similar situations and which features she judges to be 
irrelevant, and which features of  people strike her as morally significant and which ones do not. I 
claim that these cognitive features (1) partly constitute what it is to be virtuous and (2) do not need 
to derive from morally good desires (correctly conceived or not) in order to constitute virtue. Both 
of  these claims contradict SC, since, according to SC, cognitive features merely reflect or are merely 
evidence of  a virtuous character (that is, they don't constitute what it is to be virtuous) and they 
must derive from a person's good will. 
 My argument is one by analogy. First, consider the cognitive features of  a good musician. A 
good musician can notice when a chord is slightly out of  tune and when the French horn comes in 
just slightly too early during rehearsal. She can hear how different musical lines fit together, and she 
can isolate them in her head as she listens to them play simultaneously. She can hear when the 
timbre of  her cello is slightly too metallic as compared to the warm sound she imagines before she 
plays her solo. These cognitive achievements might at first require significant conscious effort, but 
may become involuntary over time. The good musician can hear things the rest of  us can't while 
listening to the same symphony. 
 What she tends to remember, notice, and judge about the music she plays or listens to is 
what makes her a musical expert, and we do not need to posit any background desires in order for 
these cognitive features to explain why she is a good musician. All we need to explain the fact that 
she is a good musician is the fact that she has the cognitive features constitutive of  being a good 
musician and her ability to play her instrument, neither of  which stem from her desires. 
 Second, consider the good scientist. It is plausible that the good scientist has at least some 
of  the following cognitive features: she has hunches that are borne out in experimental results (she 
tends to form good hypotheses), she creatively engineers solutions for setting up experiments, and 
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she can figure out why she did not get the experimental results that she expected. Just like the good 
musician, the good scientist possesses some cognitive features that make her a good scientist. We do 
not need to claim that these cognitive features causally derive from any desires in order for them to 
constitute what it is to be a good scientist. 
 Now, let's return to the observation that there is a cognitive side to virtue; the virtuous 
person has certain cognitive features that distinguish her from the vicious person, some of  which are 
listed above. For the good musician and the good scientist, their cognitive features partly constitute 
what it is to be a good musician or scientist. Moreover, it does not seem plausible to claim that these 
cognitive features contribute to the quality of  one's musical or scientific skills just in case they 
causally derive from desires. If  we did not need to explain why the good musician or a good scientist 
by reference to cognitive features that derive from desires, then I do not see why we should say that 
the virtuous person's cognitive features (qua virtuous person) reflect the quality of  her moral 
character only if  they causally derive from desires. Perhaps being a good person is like being a good 
musician or scientist in this respect; to be virtuous is (among other things) to have certain cognitive 
features, and these cognitive features need not be caused by any moral desires in order to constitute 
what it is to be virtuous. 
 One might object to this argument as follows: we do not think the quality of  a person's 
moral character is affected by merely cognitive features when these features seem to have nothing to 
do with morality. Therefore, the cognitive features that I listed above cannot constitute what it is to 
have a morally good character. For example, we don't normally think that reasoning poorly detracts 
from the quality of  a person's character, so if  a person reasons poorly about moral ideas it does not 
detract from her moral character. This is the intuition behind Brandon1, Brandon2, and Huck Finn, 
none of  whom, according to Arpaly and Schroeder, have a bad moral character in virtue of  
reasoning poorly about morality. Another example the objector might cite is this: we don't fault 
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people for perceptual failures that result in false beliefs, so we should not fault a person for failing to 
be sensitive to moral evidence that results in false moral beliefs, either. In short, all cognitive failures 
are merely cognitive failures, not failures of  character. 
 A second objection one might raise to my view comes from Kant: 
It is impossible to think of  anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could 
be considered good without limitation except a good will. Understanding, wit, judgment and 
the like, whatever such talents of  mind may be called, or courage, resolution, and 
perseverance in one's plans, as qualities of  temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable 
for many purposes, but they can also be extremely evil and harmful if  the will which is to 
make use of  these gifts of  nature, and whose distinctive constitution is therefore called 
character, is not good (GW 4:393). 
 
Here, Kant claims that “talents of  mind”—which presumably include the cognitive features I claim, 
along with Arpaly and Schroeder, to be typical of  the virtuous person—do not contribute to 
goodness of  character because these cognitive features are only good when combined with an 
already good will. Those same cognitive features, when combined with an ill will, are actually bad-
making features. The suggestion seems to be that a sadist, for example, can have the cognitive 
features typical of  the virtuous person while his character is either not made better by that or is 
worsened by it. This suggests, like the first objection, that epistemic achievements and failures 
cannot contribute to goodness of  moral character by themselves, if  they do so at all. 
 But it does seem like our practices of  moral appraisal sometimes involve judging people's 
characters for cognitive or epistemic failings. Consider arrogance. One way to understand arrogance 
it to see it as the attitude of  taking oneself  to be morally superior to others, and this would clearly be 
a morally criticizable feature that may be grounded in morally criticizable desires.17 But another 
plausible way to understand arrogance is as a cognitive failing that we find morally criticizable, 
although there are other cognitive failings that we think are morally neutral. This kind of  arrogance 
plausibly involves the following features: weighing one's own opinion more heavily than the 
                                                          
17See Tiberius and Walker (1998). 
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opinions of  others, a reluctance to change one's views in the face of  disagreement with others who 
are experts on the relevant subject, significant reluctance to suspend judgment in the face of  peer 
disagreement (or, perhaps, reluctance to conclude another person is one's epistemic peer), lack of  
sensitivity to evidence that one's views are false, and an exaggerated belief  in one’s practical 
competence. Sometimes a person may inherit these cognitive features as a result of  having an 
antecedent desire to be right about some topic or as a result of  wanting to be seen as an expert. But 
sometimes these cognitive features are not rooted in a person's desires. Someone may be arrogant 
and yet have the desires typical of  a humble person (whatever these may be). Nevertheless, we often 
respond to people who exhibit what we might call merely epistemic arrogance with moral criticism. 
 Why is that? On the one hand, it may be because we psychoanalyze people a bit. We might 
judge (for example) that a person's reluctance to overturn his opinion in light of  contradictory 
evidence from the experts reveals a morally bad desire to be superior to others. This explanation 
would appeal to Arpaly and Schroeder. But another reason we might judge the arrogant person to 
have a partly morally bad character is because he fails to take other people seriously, and taking 
others seriously is something we may have a moral obligation to do. However, taking others seriously 
constitutively involves adjusting one's views in light of  expert testimony, for example. Taking other 
seriously may involve suspending judgment in light of  peer disagreement or (more weakly) 
becoming less reluctant to suspend judgment in light of  peer disagreement. So there is at least one 
plausible explanation for why we morally criticize people for epistemic failings that don't derive from 
morally bad desires—we criticize them for their moral failings even when those failings are or look 
to be just cognitive, not conative, failings. 
 This suggests that the relevance of  cognitive features to the quality of  a person's moral 
character does not require those features to be expressions of  or be causally dependent on desires. 
Therefore, the quality of  a person's character is not fully determined by the quality of  the person's 
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will; quality of  moral character depends at least partly on cognitive elements that are causally and 
explanatorily independent of  desires. Since I agree that the quality of  a person's moral character 
does partly depend on her desires, I will call my proposal the hybrid account of  moral character. 
 Let us return to Brandon1, Brandon2, and Huckleberry Finn to see how my view applies to 
these cases. Since Brandon2 differs from Brandon1 with respect to his quality of  will—after all, 
Brandon2 does not even have the right motives, whereas Brandon1 does—the hybrid account yields 
the result that Brandon2 does not have as good a moral character as Brandon1. For now, since this is 
the only respect in which they differ morally, I will treat them in the same way for the rest of  this 
section and only speak of  Brandon1. (Though in the next section, I argue that Brandon2 does have 
a good-making feature that Brandon1 lacks.) 
 Recall that, on SC, Brandon1 and Huckleberry Finn have the same quality of  moral character 
since they both do the right thing for the right reasons—that is, they both do the right thing because 
they are motivated by an intrinsic desire for the right or the good, correctly conceived. Since both of  
them have false moral beliefs, both of  them either have something wrong with their moral belief-
forming mechanism, or with the environments in which those belief-forming processes operate, or 
both. According to the view I presented above, insofar as a person lacks the cognitive features that 
are typical of  the virtuous person, those features detract from the quality of  that person's moral 
character. The virtuous person, moreover, is sensitive to morally relevant evidence and reasons well 
morally, but Brandon1 and Huckleberry Finn both have a morally bad character insofar as they lack 
these cognitive features. 
 Plausibly, Brandon1 has bad moral belief-forming mechanisms but does not live in a 
misleading environment (i.e. an environment that is more likely to result in his having morally 
repugnant beliefs). If  we fill in the details of  Brandon1's case, we can see this clearly. Suppose he is 
living in the U.S. in 2016, that he is college-educated and that he is of  average intelligence. Then it 
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seems that we could reasonably expect Brandon1 to have somewhat reliable moral belief-forming 
mechanisms; his moral sense can be expected to be sensitive to the right or the good. But for some 
reason, Brandon1 finds himself  convinced of  the view that his self-interest should be the only thing 
guiding his actions and that other people's well-being does not matter in its own right. Given that 
Brandon1's cultural environment is rich in evidence that would point a person with a reliable moral 
belief-forming mechanism in the right direction, we should conclude that something is wrong with 
his belief-forming processes. He is, moreover, missing just those cognitive elements constitutive of  
being virtuous. To the extent that he is missing those cognitive features, then, Brandon1 is not a 
good guy. 
 By contrast, Huck has both the misfortune of  having a poor moral belief-forming 
mechanism and the misfortune of  being immersed in an environment that presents him with 
morally misleading evidence. His environment is misleading because almost everyone he respects 
and trusts believes that slavery is permissible. Insofar as Huck's belief  that turning Jim in is wrong 
results from both his poor belief-forming features and from his misleading environment, he is less 
criticizable for that belief  than if  he had formed it in an environment that was not misleading. 
Therefore, Huck Finn may have a better moral character than Brandon1, in spite of  the fact that the 
moral view he holds is more repugnant than that of  Brandon1. In fact, given the misleading 
evidence that impacts Huck's moral beliefs, he may not have as unreliable of  a moral belief-forming 
process as Brandon1 does.18 After all, a virtuous person, in a systematically misleading environment, 
might end up with moral views that are way off  the mark, just as a person with good vision will end 
up with perceptual beliefs that are way off  the mark if  she is immersed in a perceptually misleading 
environment. Nevertheless, Huck's moral belief-forming processes go wrong somewhere. 
                                                          
18Here, I am understanding the reliability counterfactually; for example, Huck's moral belief-forming mechanism is 
reliable to the extent that it would yield correct moral beliefs in an environment without any misleading evidence. 
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 In this section, I hope to have shown that the quality of  a person's moral character depends 
in part on cognitive features that do not causally derive from a person's desires. Insofar as a person's 
moral beliefs result from vicious cognitive elements, that person is morally criticizable for them in 
the sense that they reflect on the quality of  her moral character. In the next section, I will argue that 
there is another way in which beliefs can contribute to the quality of  a person's character without 
deriving from desires. 
 
The Moral Significance of  Integrity 
 In this section, I will try to show that being disposed to act self-consciously in accordance 
with one's moral views or one's conscience contributes positively to the quality of  a person's moral 
character. By the same token, being disposed to self-consciously flout one's conscience detracts from 
the quality of  one's moral character.19 Both of  these claims are true, I will argue, no matter the 
content of  one's moral beliefs. 
 To act with integrity is to act in accordance with what one sincerely and correctly takes to be 
one's deepest values and commitments—that is to say, to act with integrity is to self-consciously act 
in accordance with one's deep values; this includes moral as well as non-moral values and 
commitments.20 Therefore, if  a person acts with integrity she necessarily acts in accordance with an 
important part of  her self-conception, or her understanding of  who she is most fundamentally. 
                                                          
19I am not going to take a stand on what it is to have a disposition to behave in a certain way. Perhaps a disposition to act 
is just to have a standing desire for something. If  that is so, then the moral value of  acting in accordance with one's 
moral beliefs, insofar as it is morally valuable, will be intimately related to the desire to act in accordance with what one 
believes is right. I find this perfectly acceptable. Nonetheless, the content of  this desire (from the point of  view of  the 
person whose desire it is) is wanting to do what I believe is right. So, depending on what a disposition is, the value of  being 
disposed to act in accordance with one's conscience may turn out to be the value of  a particular desire. Nevertheless, 
Arpaly and Schroeder seem to be unable to say that this desire contributes to quality of  moral character since its 
content is not correctly conceptualized.   
 
20Here, I am stipulating this definition. I will go on to argue that this kind of  integrity is good. For a substantive account 
of  integrity and a summary of  different views of  the topic, see Calhoun (1995). 
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 We have many ways to indicate that integrity matters to us, and that it sometimes acts as a 
constraint on what we do because it constrains what we think we ought to do: (1) “I couldn't live 
with myself  if  I did that (but you go right ahead)”, (2) “As a theist, I just can't do that,” (3) 
“Sometimes, you just have to do is what you think is best,” (4) “I have to stay true to myself.” Not 
only do we use statements like this to communicate that we hold ourselves to certain standards, but 
we also respect other people when they say things like this—even when we disagree about what they 
think they “have” to do. Of  course, the meaning of  (1)-(4) may change from context to context; for 
example (1) might be used to convey an inchoate form of  moral relativism, and (4) may be utterly 
morally neutral in many contexts. But we also use these statements to express that acting in 
accordance with what we take to be our deep commitments to morality and to our personal projects 
matters to us. This bit of  linguistic evidence motivates the view that we take acting with integrity to 
be a good thing. 
 Perhaps there are limits to how much we can respect someone who thinks that she has to do 
something life-threatening in order to stay true to herself; we might say, in cases like this, that she 
doesn't know what's good for her. That is, although staying true to oneself  is something we take to 
be good, its significance may not outweigh prudential considerations. There are almost certainly 
limits to how much we would respect someone who, for example, thinks she has to stay true to her 
Nazi values by killing her children.21 Nevertheless, we often take the feeling conveyed by statements 
like “I have to do this” seriously, where the emphasis is not just on the “have to”, but also on the 
“I”. I think statements like (1)-(4) are morally significant, but not because sincerely believing one of  
them automatically makes it right to act on that basis (it doesn't). Rather, I think that acting on the 
basis of  these beliefs (e.g., your belief  that you couldn't live with yourself  if  you did that) 
                                                          
21Magda and Joseph Geobbels murdered their five children the day they committed suicide on May 1, 1945, perhaps out 
of  loyalty to Hitler. 
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contributes to a person's moral goodness or virtue to some extent. 
 That being said, I think we must leave open the possibility that a person can be truly evil 
although she has integrity. It may be the case that being a good person or being virtuous is a 
threshold concept. By this I mean that, in order to count as being a good person, someone has to 
meet a certain threshold—she has to exemplify a certain cluster of  properties (or one of  a number 
of  clusters of  properties), but that none of  these properties alone is necessary or sufficient for 
meeting the threshold. But even if  goodness of  character is not a threshold concept, it's unlikely 
that our concept of  extreme evil requires that the evil person has no good-making character 
features. So, my claim that integrity contributes to good moral character does not entail that villains 
who act in accordance with conscience cannot be villains after all. 
 What I have said so far entails that someone with evil moral commitments and desires is less 
evil in virtue of  self-consciously acting on the belief  that what she is doing is morally right. Acting 
with integrity is, I claim, something of  a saving grace. However, this is not to say that someone like 
Huck Finn would have had a better moral character all things considered if  he had acted with 
integrity. Recall that I am not giving a theory of  how to weigh all of  the factors that contribute to 
and detract from the quality of  a person's moral character. It may be true that Huck has a better 
moral character than someone who would have followed her conscience. But someone else who 
follows her conscience and later realizes how wrong she was in doing so has a redeeming quality 
about her—namely, that she tried to morally do her best, though she failed miserably. 
 Let us turn to some examples that intuitively seem to support my claim that integrity 
contributes to goodness of  character: 
Anne and Julius are close friends and want to resolve a conflict between them. Anne asks a 
friend for advice, and in the course of  explaining the problem tells her about a dark secret in 
Julius's past. Anne later tells Julius about the conversation. Julius feels betrayed. He asks 
Anne to lie to her friend in order to try to cover up the secret. Even though she believes 
lying is often morally permissible and realizes that lying would cause little harm to others and 
greatly benefit Julius, Anne refuses, citing the fact that being honest with those who are 
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closest to her is one of  her deepest moral values. 
 
Suppose that Anne in fact acts wrongly when she fails to lie to her friend. Even so, there still seems 
to be something good about her. This can be explained on the assumption that integrity is a good 
thing. Although Anne acted wrongly, she tried to do right according to her sincerely held moral 
commitments. We might say that Anne reasonably denies Julius' request to flout her deep moral 
values even though she was wrong to do so. Given that this is not (by hypothesis) a life-threatening 
situation for Julius (rather, the fact that the secret is out is something that he is uncomfortable with 
but not endangered by), we intuitively judge that Anne reasonably sticks with her conscience. This 
reasonableness that she instantiates cannot be explained by the fact that self-consciously acting in 
accordance with her moral view makes the action right, since we've supposed it is wrong. But 
integrity provides Anne with a pro tanto reason for refraining from lying. She did the wrong thing but 
for a right reason. 
 Anne's example, insofar as it shows that one has a pro tanto reason to act with integrity, 
suggests that we may not be able to separate moral psychology from normative ethics quite as much 
as Arpaly and Schroeder intend to do. Arpaly and Schroeder explicitly state a commitment to 
articulating a moral psychology that does not presuppose many, if  any, particular first order ethical 
claims.22 They suggest that first order normative theories and moral psychology stand apart in that 
we can do one without doing the other. Examples like Anne's, however, seem to suggest otherwise. 
 Another example: 
A father and son have been estranged for a long time as a result of  the son's resentment. 
                                                          
22“By being focused on our psychological relationship to morality, moral psychology does something different from 
other branches of  moral theory. Normative moral theory tells us what it is right or wrong to do, and what states of  
affairs are morally good or bad. Meta-ethical theory tells us what kinds of  things rightness, wrongness, goodness, and 
badness are in the first place. But moral psychology takes for granted that certain things are right or good, and other 
things wrong or bad. The job of  moral psychology is to tell us how, in acting, feeling, and thinking, we end up related 
to the right and the good, or the wrong and the bad,” (1). Throughout the book, Arpaly and Schroeder try to show that 
their theory of  moral psychology is compatible with plausible but inconsistent first order moral theories, which also 
suggests that they take on board a commitment to be neutral between these moral theories. 
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The son resents his father for being, in his view, far too strict with him. The father would use 
corporal punishment in the form of  spanking the son when he was young in order to change 
his behavior. The father thought he was doing exactly what a good father should do. He 
would sincerely think to himself, “I don't want to do this, but I have to bring him up well.” 
Years later, when they speak openly about the past, the son learns that the father wanted to 
be a good dad and sincerely thought he was doing the right thing. Suppose that the father 
acted wrongly when he would frequently use corporal punishment. 
 
Intuitively, it would be reasonable of  the son to forgive his father because the father sincerely 
believed that he had to do those things in order to be a good father. He acted in accordance with his 
conscience. Insofar as one has the intuition that this would justify the son's forgiving his father, one 
should also conclude that the father had a partially good moral character in the past. 
 Arpaly and Schroeder are not able to say that the father has a partly good moral character as 
a result of  following his conscience and doing the wrong thing; this is because his doing the wrong 
is either a desire for the wrong thing (de re), or a desire for the right thing (being a good father) 
wrongly conceived, depending on how we fill in the details. With respect to Anne, they would have 
to say that her desire not to lie to her friend is simply not the right intrinsic desire (since we 
supposed that Anne acted wrongly), and so she cannot have a good moral character in virtue of  
sticking with her conscience. Now Arpaly and Schroeder argue partly from examples, and partly 
from explanatory power; here, I am engaging with them by pointing out intuitions one might 
reasonably have in response to the examples I've given. Of  course, no theory will be able to 
accommodate all of  our intuitions. But it is worth pointing out that not only do these examples 
seem intuitive, but we also take statements like (1)-(4) as indicators of  partial goodness of  moral 
character. 
 If  I am right about the value of  acting with integrity, then Brandon2, who does the wrong 
thing for the wrong reasons, still has a redeeming quality because he acts with integrity. Brandon1 
fails to act with integrity but does not self-consciously act in a way that flouts his commitments, 
since he realizes his mistake only later. Huck Finn fails to act with integrity in a stronger sense than 
25 
 
Brandon1 because he does self-consciously flout his moral convictions. Insofar as one has the 
intuition that Brandon2 is the worst of  these three characters (and I do), however, one might think 
that integrity does not matter as much as having the right motives. Perhaps acting with integrity gives 
one's moral character a “boost”, but it cannot compensate for having a significant amount of  ill will 
or moral indifference. 
 
Explanatory Advantages 
 A hybrid view that accepts both the moral significance of  desires and beliefs can explain the 
moral value of  acting in accordance with one's commitments in urgent cases of  peer disagreement 
and epistemic indeterminacy. “Urgent” here refers to the fact that one has to decide at some point 
what to do, and sometimes quite quickly. If  deliberation has to stop—either because a person 
cannot figure out on his or her own what the morally right action will be in time, or because two 
people are disagreeing and the conflict cannot be resolved before it's too late—what should bring 
deliberation to a halt is not a coin flip, say, but one's own commitments. Integrity can serve as a tie-
breaker in urgent situations. Moreover, if  someone sticks with her conscience in such a situation, we 
would not fault her for it; we would not only think this was epistemically rational, but morally 
praiseworthy (provided it wasn't the result of  thick-headedness or close-mindedness, or some other 
vice). 
 A hybrid view can also explain, much more naturally than Spare Conativism could, the moral 
significance of  statements such as “Sometimes, you just have to do what you think is best” and “I 
couldn't live with myself  if  I did that.” Supposing that these statements are morally significant and 
supposing that they do not ground the rightness of  the relevant action in question, Spare 
Conativism would have to paraphrase them into statements about intrinsic desires. But, it's not clear 
how such a paraphrase would go, since it would seem to make these statements lose their moral 
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significance. For example, “Sometimes, you just have to do what you think is best” could not be 
paraphrased into “Sometimes, you just have to do what you want,” since merely wanting something 
does not carry the same moral significance as the original statement. Stating “I was just doing what I 
thought was best” would excuse someone from blame in light of  having acting wrongly (as we saw 
in the father/son example), but “I was just doing what I wanted” would never excuse someone from 
such blame. This suggests that the language of  desires cannot fully capture the significance of  acting 
on the basis of  one's beliefs. 
 Likewise, “I couldn't live with myself  if  I did that” is not properly paraphrased into 
something like “I couldn't live with myself  if  I did something I didn't really want to do.” The 
paraphrases, then, would have to be more subtle than these. I am not saying it would be impossible 
to articulate them, but I doubt that we will be able to preserve the moral significance of  the original 
sentences in most cases. 
 Of  course, the statements in question (such as statements 1-4) might not be morally 
significant, after all. This may turn out to be an assumption we throw out as we get close to reaching 
reflective equilibrium. But our moral language is one piece of  evidence that we should take seriously 
during inquiry. 
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